Epistemology of Liberalism and the Liberalization of Nonliberal Societies

Liberalism is a political tradition that arose in early modern Europe and evolved into the doctrine that grounds state legitimacy in the protection of individual freedom and equality. For the past two decades, it has faced mounting global challenges and renewed doubts about its identity. A prominent criticism is that it is merely another sectarian ideology, despite its self-presentation as neutral among rival conceptions of the good life. Recent scholarship has largely emphasized its moral commitments such as liberty, equality, and toleration. Its epistemic dimensions, however, have been ignored or rejected, mainly because epistemic commitments have been deemed more controversial or partisan than moral ones. Yet, properly formulated, epistemic commitments need not be divisive, and ignoring them has yielded an incomplete picture of liberalism.

This dissertation develops a nonsectarian account of the epistemology of liberalism and uses this account to propose what I call ‘doctrinal liberalization’ for nonliberal (particularly Muslim-majority) societies. I focus on public reason liberalism—according to which, roughly, political decisions must be “publicly justifiable” to citizens—since it represents the dominant strand in contemporary liberal theory. The dissertation consists of three chapters: the first articulates the analytic epistemology of liberalism and the second its social epistemology; the third sets out a model of doctrinal liberalization.

Chapter 1 addresses the criticism that public reason liberalism is epistemically sectarian. I argue that the epistemic commitment of public reason liberalism is best understood as the underdetermination thesis, the claim that more than one belief can be rationally held on the same body of evidence. Citizens who reason competently and in good faith may therefore diverge politically without any of them being irrational. Unlike fallibilism or skepticism, underdetermination asks no citizen to doubt her own convictions; it is also an idea long familiar in science. It thus supplies a nonsectarian epistemic framework that preserves liberal neutrality amid reasonable disagreement.

Chapter 2 turns to the social epistemology of liberalism, namely, epistemic virtues. I argue that a liberal polity needs not only formal liberal institutions but also an epistemically virtuous citizenry, chief among these virtues open-mindedness: without it, citizens cannot recognize rival positions as reasonable, and public justification—a requirement of public reason liberalism—breaks degree.

Building upon the previous chapters, Chapter 3 develops and defends a new model of liberalization for nonliberal societies. This model, ‘doctrinal liberalization’, is the transformation of moderately unreasonable comprehensive doctrines (belief systems) into reasonable ones, a process distinct from the political and economic liberalization studied in the social sciences. On this model, a nonliberal society whose prevalent doctrines (say, nationalism, Islam, and Confucianism) transform into reasonable versions of themselves can sustain a liberal order without its citizens becoming liberals in the classical or comprehensive sense. I illustrate this model with a case study of Islam and apply it to Turkey.

In sum, the epistemology of liberalism I articulate has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, it shows that liberalism has epistemic as well as moral commitments, and that these can be stated without sectarianism. Practically, it identifies the epistemic conditions a liberal polity must sustain in its citizens, and grounds the model of doctrinal liberalization I propose for nonliberal societies seeking liberal reform on their own terms.

Committee: Lenn Goodman (chair), Scott Aikin, Jacob Barrett, David Thorstad, Chandran Kukathas