Dissertation
My dissertation is on the epistemology of liberalism and the liberalization of nonliberal societies. It argues that liberalism is not only a moral but also an epistemic order. It does that by (1) formulating the nontrivial epistemological commitment of political liberalism, (2) articulating the epistemic character of liberal societies, and (3) developing a theory of philosophical liberalization.
(1) Political liberalism wants to remain neutral on controversial epistemological and metaphysical issues to ensure state neutrality toward competing belief systems citizens hold. How possible is this aspiration of neutrality? I argue that political liberalism has one nontrivial epistemological commitment, namely, the underdetermination thesis, which holds that evidence in scientific and moral issues supports multiple, rival belief systems and that different people are therefore justified in holding different, competing belief systems.
(2) Liberal theory has focused chiefly on liberal institutions, overlooking the import of intellectual virtues to sustain a liberal society. Putting liberal theory and virtue/vice epistemology in conversation, I articulate the liberal epistemic character. I show why citizens of liberal societies must possess certain intellectual virtues—and avoid certain epistemic vices—to maintain a liberal polity.
(3) Building upon the earlier two chapters, I develop a theory of philosophical liberalization and apply it to nonliberal yet semi-democratic Muslim-majority societies (e.g., Turkey, Morocco, etc.). I contend that philosophical liberalization is a matter of "belief system revision," namely, the transformation of an unreasonable belief system into a reasonable one. Theories of public reason provide resources to model this transformation. Efforts toward the political and economic liberalization of Muslim-majority societies should be supplemented with philosophical liberalization.